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We investigate the effects of S&P’s sovereign re-ratings on the higher moments  of 
equity market returns over recent financial crises. Using a set of intraday stock market 
index prices and sovereign credit ratings for a sample of 36 countries which 
experienced sovereign rating changes over the period from 1996 - 2013, we find that 
the higher moments of stock market returns are significantly more responsive to 
sovereign re-ratings during financial crises but the effects on stock markets are not the 
same across different financial crises. The effects during crises are however magnified 
for large downgrades and those that are associated with a loss of investment grade 
status. We find that there are asymmetric effects during financial crises in that 
downgrades are consistently more significant than upgrades in increasing realized 
volatility and realized kurtosis. Both upgrades and downgrades affect realized 
skewness in times of crises in the expected direction. 
JEL: G15, F30, F31 
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1. Introduction 
Credit rating agencies are known as specialist financial information intermediaries 
and serve to facilitate the efficient operation of financial markets. Yet, the 
informational value of credit ratings and the impact of rating agencies in the 
international financial system continues to be widely debated, particularly their 
procyclical role in amplifying financial crises (see, for example, Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (1999), Michaelides et al. (2014) and Reisen and von Maltzan (1999)).  
 The recent spate of downgrades given by credit rating agencies over the period 
from 2011-2013 to advanced countries like the UK, France, Spain and Italy alongside 
the troubled sovereigns like Greece, Portugal and Cyprus during the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis motivates a need to address whether rating agencies’ actions in 
times of financial crises are potentially destabilizing for financial market activity. The 
International Monetary Fund (2010) has stressed that sovereign credit risk is one of 
the main current threats to global economic stability.  
It has been documented in the recent literature that there are significant effects 
on firm performance within a country when the country’s sovereign credit ratings 
have been revised. For instance, Cumming, Hou and Wu (2014) show that sovereign 
governance (as proxied by sovereign credit ratings) is an important determinant of 
firm value and affects firm performance distinctly over and above the more traditional 
aspects of firm-level corporate governance. More recently, Hill, Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick and Faff (2014) and Bedendo and Colla (2013) have shown that there is a 
strong dependence between sovereign and firm credit risk within a country. As such, 
it is important to understand how changes in sovereign governance captured by 
sovereign credit rating revisions can affect all firms’ stock performance in aggregate 
within a country. However, our work deviates from prior studies that have focused 
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exclusively on assessing the market impact of sovereign credit ratings on stock returns 
and volatility by focusing on the effects of rating activity on the higher moments of 
stock returns over different types of financial crises.  
There is an extensive literature linking the information content of sovereign 
credit ratings and stock market activity (see Brooks et al., 2004, Ferreira and Gama, 
2007 and Hill and Faff, 2010 amongst others). There are two potential channels 
through which sovereign credit ratings would affect the stock market. First, sovereign 
credit ratings reflect the perceived future macroeconomic strength and fiscal 
soundness of a country. Hence, as these credit assessments deteriorate it is more likely 
that national governments will look to increase corporate taxes levied on firms in that 
country and this should be reflected in aggregate stock market performance. Second, 
sovereign credit ratings are understood to provide a ‘debt ceiling’ for all corporate 
debt issued from a given country suggesting that as sovereign credit ratings are 
revised then the cost of and even the access to debt for firms is also affected and this 
should also be reflected in firms’ stock prices. Consistent with this view, Almeida et 
al. (2014) show that due to the sovereign ceiling effect, firms with credit ratings on 
parity or above their country’s sovereign credit ratings are affected to a greater extent 
by sovereign rating downgrades. When the sovereign gets downgraded, these firms 
are forced to cut back on corporate investments as their borrowing costs increase from 
rating agencies’ flow-on adjustments to their corporate credit ratings. 
The main objective of our paper is to investigate the market impact of 
sovereign rating changes over several recent major episodes of financial crises for a 
global sample of countries. We employ a matched panel data method to fully capture 
a country’s own rating impacts and we use intraday stock market data within a trading 
week to compute the second, third and fourth realized moment of stock market 
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returns. We ask four related questions: 1) Do sovereign re-ratings have a greater 
impact on higher moments during times of financial crises? 2) Are there asymmetric 
impacts on higher moments with downgrades being more significant than upgrades? 
3) Does the nature of the re-rating matter in terms of size and investment grade status? 
4) Are sovereign re-ratings more significant in debt crises?  
Focusing on the higher moments of realized return distributions is critical to 
fully understanding the potentially destabilizing effects of sovereign credit 
assessments within equity markets, especially during times of financial turmoil when 
the fat-tailed nature of stock returns become more prominent. Yet, there has been little 
attention placed on the impact of credit ratings on the higher moments of asset return 
distributions. The transmission of information contained in sovereign ratings can 
conceivably extend to affect the dynamics of higher moments such as variance, 
skewness and kurtosis. The shape of return distributions dictated by their higher 
moments are known to influence financial decision making and studies like Hong and 
Stein (2003) show, for example, that skewness is related to information dispersion 
within financial markets. Other studies such as Harvey and Siddique (2000), 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Albuquerque (2012) document the importance 
of the third and fourth moments of equity returns and their predictability for stock 
returns. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) also highlighted that funding constraints 
can lead to high volatility and kurtosis as well as negatively skewed returns in equity 
markets. When sovereign credit ratings are downgraded, the cost of financing for 
firms increase via the sovereign ceiling mechanism and this is likely to affect the 
higher moments of stock returns.  
We find evidence that rating events become more significant in affecting the 
higher moments of returns during financial crises suggesting that rating agency 
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decisions do contribute to greater financial market instability in times of crises.  We 
find there are also asymmetric impacts of sovereign re-ratings on higher moments and 
that large multi-notch downgrades and those resulting in loss of a country’s 
investment grade status are particularly destabilizing for equity markets. We also find 
evidence to indicate that equity markets are more sensitive to sovereign re-ratings 
during debt-related crises. 
Our findings have real implications for financial market participants. A 
clearer understanding of sovereign rating impacts during financial crises is important 
for users of credit ratings like equity analysts, financial risk managers and policy 
makers in dealing with recurring financial crises and financial market instability. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide a 
description of data and sampling, followed by empirical modelling in Section 3. In 
Section 4 we discuss our findings before concluding in Section 5.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 There is an extensive literature documenting the stock market impacts of 
sovereign credit ratings and its spillover effects internationally. Whilst the impacts on 
other financial markets have also been studied, we focus only on reviewing the stock 
market impact literature as our study is the most closely aligned with this body of 
work. 
 Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) document that during the 1997-98 Asian 
Financial Crisis daily stock price movements were heavily influenced by credit rating 
agencies’ news on countries within the region and that stock market participants 
overreacted to such news.   
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 Brooks et al. (2004) investigate the impact of sovereign credit ratings on 
national equity markets over the sample period from 1 January 1973 to 31 July 2001 
and show that rating downgrades in particular have negative impacts on domestic 
stock market returns. Taking an event study approach, they find 1-day abnormal 
returns of –197 basis points in reaction to a one-notch drop in the country’s own 
sovereign credit ratings. Of the major rating agencies examined, they reveal that 
Standard and Poor’s exerts the greatest stock market impact. 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) also examine the impact of sovereign credit 
ratings activity across various financial crises during the second half of the 1990s. 
However, they do not differentiate between the size of sovereign credit re-ratings as 
they only test the significance of indicator variables that take on non-zero values for 
any change in sovereign credit ratings or outlooks.  They find that stock markets are 
affected more by sovereign rating activity during financial crises and that cross-
country spillover effects are only significant during crisis periods consistent with the 
development of financial contagion. 
 Hill and Faff (2010) contribute further evidence on sovereign credit rating 
actions during financial crises. They extend upon the initial work of Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002) and examine a larger number of financial crises up to the early 
2000s. They also find that the information content of sovereign credit ratings activity 
is stronger during financial crises relative to non-crisis periods.  However, they only 
assess the market impact of sovereign credit ratings based on cumulative stock market 
returns. In a related vein, Fei, Fuertes and Kalotychou (2012) examine credit rating 
migration over the business cycle and show that rating downgrades are concentrated 
in periods of economic contractions. Overall, these studies suggest that rating activity 
may potentially destabilize financial markets and exacerbate financial crises.  
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 Instead of focusing on own-country rating impacts, Ferreira and Gama (2007) 
also investigate the spillover effects of sovereign credit ratings into international stock 
markets. Similar to Kaminsky and Schmukler (2007), they also document that rating 
spillovers were more significant in international equity markets during earlier 
international financial crises in the 1990s and early 2000s. They use an event study 
approach and document the cumulative effects on stock market return spreads (return 
differential vis-à-vis the US) from changes in sovereign credit assessments (rating 
events) over two-day windows. They find a negative reaction of 51 basis points in 
non-event countries in response to sovereign credit rating downgrades. Upgrades, 
however, have no significant impact on return spreads of non-event countries. 
Furthermore, they show that closeness (e.g., geographic proximity, trade linkages) 
and emerging market status amplify the effect of a rating spillover. 
 While the heightened information value of sovereign credit assessments for 
stock market returns during financial crises is established in the current literature, 
there has been much less attention placed on the impacts on the higher moments of 
stock market returns in times of crises.1 We aim to fill this void in the literature. To 
our best knowledge, we are the first to provide comprehensive empirical evidence on 
the nature of sovereign credit re-ratings and their effects on higher return moments 
across a complete history of past as well as more recent financial crises. We argue that 
not all financial crises are the same in terms of causes and effects and a reliable 
assessment of sovereign re-rating effects requires a broad experiment across several 
types of financial crises. 
 
                                                 
1 Recently, Do et al. (2014) document the effects of sovereign rating regimes on higher moments of 
equity returns for a small sample of European stock markets during the European Debt Crisis. 
However, they do not examine rating upgrade or downgrade events per se but rather the time periods 
(or regimes) during which there have been upgrades and downgrades. 
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3. Data description 
Our dataset consists of the intraday price levels for representative stock market 
indices from a sample of 36 countries. The countries in our sample all experienced 
sovereign credit rating changes over the period from 2 January 1996 to 13 November 
2013. The intraday data are tick-by-tick stock market index levels captured from 
Reuters’ trading terminals and provided by SIRCA (Securities Industry Research 
Centre of Asia) in their Thomson Reuters Tick History database.  
In addition, we use the history of long-term sovereign credit ratings on 
foreign currency denominated debt from Standard and Poors as a country’s ability to 
service debt in foreign hard currencies is what truly matters when sovereign obligors 
have the option to print money to repay debt denominated in their local currency.2 As 
the timing of ratings announcements are irregular,3 we focus on the impact of ratings 
announcements on realized return-based measures in the week in which a rating 
change occurs. It has been documented in prior studies like Brooks et al. (2004) and 
Michaelides et al. (2014) that there are cumulative effects on stock market returns 
over the few days around a sovereign rating change.4 Following the approach of 
Gande and Parsley (2005) and Ferreira and Gama (2007) (among others), we first 
transform actual ratings given by S&P into linear scores and we analyse the influence 
                                                 
2 Previous studies reveal that S&P rating changes exert the greatest impact on stock market returns and 
are less anticipated (see, e.g., Reisen and von Maltzan (1999), Brooks et al. (2004) and Hill and Faff 
(2010)). Furthermore, Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010) show that Standard and Poors’ sovereign credit 
ratings are the least dependent on other rating agencies actions and Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012b) 
reveal that S&P credit assessments are more accurate. In unreported results, we also find that ratings on 
local currency denominated debt have much weaker effects on higher moments. These results are 
available upon request.  
3 While S&P ratings announcements are generally made a.m. local time, the exact timing varies. 
Michaelides et al. (2014) also highlight that there exists a period of a few days during which rating 
agencies consult with the rated entity after the rating decision has been approved but before the public 
announcement.  
4 Unlike prior studies, we do not directly test the effects of sovereign outlooks and watches provided by 
rating agencies as these are temporary assessments that are usually changed again or lead to permanent 
rating changes within a few days and are thus, less meaningful at the weekly frequency. Hence, our 
results serve to provide a lower bound on the stock market impact of sovereign ratings activity during 
financial crises. 
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of rating revisions.  We define an actual ‘rating event’ as a non-zero change in the 
linearised rating scores. We examine a total of 222 sovereign rating events in our 
overall sample (comprising 106 upgrades and 116 downgrades). These are 
summarised in Table 1 and the distribution of sovereign rating revisions by country is 
summarised in Table 2. In Table 1, both Panels A and B show that 91 per cent of all 
upgrades and 72% of all downgrades are adjustments of a single notch. They also 
report that there are more multi-notch downgrades (28%) than upgrades (9%). Table 2 
shows that Indonesia is the most actively re-rated country in our sample, having 
experienced a total of 19 events, closely followed by Argentina and Greece with 16 
rating revisions each. Greece however, has experienced the highest incidence of 
multi-notch re-ratings (3 upgrades, 6 downgrades) followed by Indonesia (3 upgrades, 
4 downgrades). These countries have been at the heart of major financial crises in 
Asian, Latin America and Europe throughout our sample period. Panel D of Table 1 
shows that sovereign re-ratings occur primarily for emerging markets (81% of 
upgrades and 63% of downgrades) consistent with Ferreira and Gama’s (2007) earlier 
finding on more significant rating spillovers to emerging markets. 
 
<Insert Tables 1 & 2>  
 
As depicted in Figure 1, credit rating agencies are generally more active in 
re-rating countries around periods of international financial crises than in non-crisis 
periods. Table 1 Panel C also shows that 87% of downgrades and 64% of upgrades 
occur during financial crises.  
<Insert Figure 1> 
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Based on the work of Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Barndorff-Nielsen 
and Shephard (2001) and Andersen et al. (2003), we argue that realized measures 
calculated based on intraday returns provides more consistent and efficient measures 
than their counterparts computed from close to close prices. We consider the first four 
moments of realized returns. 
We define weekly realized returns as: 
Rݐ ൌ ∑ ݎ݀,ݐ݀ܦൌ1 																		                                (1) 
and the weekly realized volatility as: 
	
RVݐ ൌ ∑ ݎ݀,ݐ2݀ܦൌ1                           (2) 
where ,d tr denotes a dth 5-minute return5 during all trading days in week t and D 
denotes the total number of 5-minute return intervals over the week in which a re-
rating takes place.6  
 The weekly realized skewness for any given week t is calculated as: 
	
ܴܵݐ ൌ √ܦ∑ ݎ݀,ݐ
3݀ܦൌ1
ቀ∑ ݎ݀,ݐ2݀ܦൌ1 ቁ
3 2⁄                                               (3)                              
 
and we compute weekly realized kurtosis as: 
RKݐ ൌ ܦ∑ ݎ݀,ݐ
4݀ܦൌ1
ቀ∑ ݎ݀,ݐ2݀ܦൌ1 ቁ
2                                                     (4) 
where ,d tr denotes a dth 5-minute return7 during all trading days in week t and D 
denotes the total number of 5-minute return intervals over the week in which a re-
rating takes place. 
                                                 
5 The intraday return is calculated as the log difference of the stock market index level at the end and 
beginning of the dth interval.  
6 Based on volatility signature plots (available upon request), we use the daily realized measures 
computed from 5 minute intervals for our empirical estimations as they are most stable for this 
sampling interval. As a robustness check, we also use measures based on alternative lower frequency 
sampling intervals (10, 15, and 30 minutes). Our regression results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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Table 3 reports the average values of the first four weekly realized moments 
of stock market return distributions for each of our 36 sample countries. Over the 
entire sample period studied, we find that Uruguay’s stock market index has provided 
the lowest return (-0.19 percent on a weekly basis) while both Malta’s and 
Venezuela’s stock market index provides the highest return (0.77 percent per week). 
New Zealand’s stock market index exhibits the lowest sample volatility, while 
Uruguay’s stock market index is the most volatile. Consistent with the second 
moment, there is also a wide variation in the degree of kurtosis across countries 
ranging from Italy’s 1.128 to 529.35 for Malta. Typically, emerging markets like 
Brazil, Colombia, Ireland and Malta exhibit the highest kurtosis values indicating that 
they have extremely fat-tailed return distributions.  Most countries have a left-skewed 
return distribution (with Brazil having the most negative skew of -19.82) but there are 
also a number of emerging markets with right-skewed return distributions (Malta tops 
the list at 22.41). These properties are consistent with stylized facts regarding 
emerging market returns.  
<Insert Table 3> 
 
4. Empirical modeling  
We examine changes in sovereign credit ratings assigned by S&P to a sample 
country’s foreign currency denominated sovereign debt.  Following the approach of 
Gande and Parsley (2005) and Ferreira and Gama (2007) (among others), we 
transform actual ratings into linear scores. We analyse the influence of re-ratings to 
                                                                                                                                            
7 The intraday return is calculated as the log difference of the stock market index level at the end and 
beginning of the dth interval.  
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understand the effects of rating agencies’ decisions on the higher moments of stock 
market returns. 
In the spirit of Ferreira and Gama (2007), we construct two balanced panel 
datasets comprising weekly observations for rating event countries matched with 
randomly selected non-rating event countries (within our sample of 36 countries) in 
order to run separate regressions for sovereign rating upgrades and downgrades 
relative to a benchmark of randomly selected non-event country-weeks. However, 
unlike Ferreira and Gama (2007) we assess realized moments in the week in which 
the re-rating occurred rather than in 2 day post-event windows as firstly, this accounts 
for the information leakage problem recently documented by Michaelides et al. (2014) 
in the pre-announcement consultation phase for the rated sovereign. Second, we use a 
cumulative measure of rating changes within a week denoted as notch_w, to control 
for the intensity and magnitude of re-rating activity in the actual week in which a 
rating event occurs. Third, the weekly frequency is better suited to accommodating 
macroeconomic control variables that are based on data available at lower 
frequencies. Hence, we estimate the following base-line panel regression specification 
with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors to account for time-invariant 
omitted variables:  
	
ܴܯ݅,ݐ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ1ܴܯ݅,ݐെ1 ൅ ߚ2ܴܽݐ݅݊݃݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ3݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ4ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐ ൅ ߚ5ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐൈ ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ6ܺ݅,ݐ ൅ ݑ݅,ݐ 
 (5)
 
where RMi,t is the realized moment (volatility (RV), skewness (RS), kurtosis (RK)) for 
country i in week t; RMi,t-1 is the realized moment in the past week; RATING is the 
average level of country i’s linearized  sovereign credit rating score during week t; 
notch_w are the cumulative weekly rating changes and Crisis is an indicator variable 
denoting the periods of financial crises (Asian financial crisis – AFC, Russian debt 
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crisis – RDC, Technology bust – TECH, the global financial crisis – GFC, European 
debt crisis – EDC, and ALL aggregates all the individual major and minor financial 
crises occurring during our sample period).8 X is a matrix of macroeconomic controls 
which may affect stock market performance. The main variables of interest in our 
baseline model are notch_w and its interactions with the crisis indicator. The ratings 
variable (in levels) controls for the relative position of each country on the rating scale 
i.e. their creditworthiness. It has been highlighted by Ferreira and Gama (2007) that 
the impact of sovereign credit information is not the same in countries of differing 
credit quality. 
We investigate whether sovereign re-ratings are significant in financial crises 
even after controlling for some economic determinants that are known to often serve 
as inputs into agencies’ credit rating models (Hill, Brooks and Faff (2010)). We 
incorporate into the X matrix log GDP (in millions) to proxy the size and performance 
of a country’s economy (Log_GDP); the volatility of the local exchange rate against 
the US dollar measured as rolling weekly standard deviations of the local currency’s 
returns (FX_vol). Monetary policy is a tight monetary policy regime indicator 
(Mon_policy) taking a value of 1 from the week when short term interest rates 
increased until the next interest rate cut at which time it reverts to a value of 0 until 
the next interest rate hike. 
Since there is an extensive list of potential determinants for stock market 
returns-based measures, we utilise a ‘general to specific’ model selection approach. 
For brevity, we only report estimation results for the most parsimonious model with 3 
                                                 
8 The Asian, Russian and Tech financial crises dummy variables are defined to take a value of one in 
weeks during the relevant financial crisis and zero otherwise, based on dates in Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002) and Kaminsky et al. (2003). The beginning of the European debt crisis on Dec. 2008 
is based on the events reported in the Bank for International Settlements’ Committee on the Global 
Financial System’s (BIS, 2011) study on sovereign and bank funding risks and the dating of the GFC 
from Jul. 2007 is based on the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis’ website 
(https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline).  
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key macroeconomic control variables to avoid over-identification in our estimations. 
We report the model specification which provides the best fit for all realized higher 
moments assessed across the equity markets studied. 
 To investigate whether the size of re-ratings matters for the impact of re-
ratings during financial crises we run the model shown in Eq. (6): 
 
	
ܴܯ݅,ݐ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ1ܴܯ݅,ݐെ1 ൅ ߚ2ܴܽݐ݅݊݃݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ3ݏ݈݅݊݃݁_݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ4݉ݑ݈ݐ݅_݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ൅ ߚ5ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐ ൅ ߚ6ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐ ൈ ݏ݈݅݊݃݁_݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ7ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐൈ݉ݑ݈ݐ݅_݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ8ܺ݅,ݐ ൅ ݑ݅,ݐ 
(6) 
where the dependent variables represented by RMi,t and the independent variables 
Ratingi,t and Crisist are as defined previously and single_notch_wi,t and 
multi_notch_wi,t are the sum of all sovereign rating changes of a single notch and of 
multiple notches, respectively over the trading week in which a rating event occurs. 
Next, as many institutional investors are restricted from investing in non-
investment grade assets we also examine the critical re-ratings across the investment 
grade threshold using Eq. (7). Rigobon (2002) highlighted that after Mexico’s 
upgrade to investment grade in 2000, foreign investors piled into investing in 
Mexican assets. It is likely that the foreign investment channel will magnify the 
effects of sovereign rating events on stock market stability. 
	
ܴܯ݅,ݐ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ1ܴܯ݅,ݐെ1 ൅ ߚ2ܴܽݐ݅݊݃݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ3݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ4ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐ ൅ ߚ5ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐൈ ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ6ܫܩ_݄ܿ݃݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ7݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൈ ܫܩ_݄ܿ݃݅,ݐ൅ ߚ8݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൈ ܫܩ_݄ܿ݃݅,ݐ ൈ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐ ൅ ߚ9ܺ݅,ݐ ൅ ݑ݅,ݐ 
                 
(7) 
where the dependent variables represented by RMi,t and the independent variables 
Ratingi,t, notch_wi,t and Crisist are as defined previously and IG_chgi,t is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 when there has been a rating change associated with a 
change in investment grade status and 0 otherwise.
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 Lastly, we re-estimate Eq. (5) with individual crises to compare the impact of 
different episodes of financial crises on the higher moments of stock return 
distributions. We expect that debt-related crises will be more responsive to sovereign 
re-ratings than other types of financial crises and hence the impacts on higher 
moments should be greater.  
 
5.  Results 
5.1. Rating impact on realized higher moments of stock returns during crises 
Our primary concern with regard to our baseline empirical test rests with the 
outcome for the weekly intensity of re-rating variable (notch_w), especially during 
periods of financial crises (hence, the interaction term with Crisis). Notch_w is the 
weekly cumulative change in rating scores. It is advantageous over event indicator 
variables used to assess market reaction in prior research (see, for example, Ferreira 
and Gama (2007) and Gande and Parsley (2005)) as it is a continuous variable that 
can capture the intensity of rating activity within the week of a rating event. 
 
<Insert Table 4> 
 
Table 4 reports the impact of notch_w on local stock market realized volatility, 
skewness and kurtosis. In normal times, notch_w is only significant in affecting RV 
upon a downgrade. The economic impact is not strong with a one-notch downgrade 
increasing RV by 4 basis points. A possible explanation is that during normal times 
the adjustment to ratings information in equity markets is instantaneous so our weekly 
measures are not significantly affected due to price reversals. 
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However, financial crises appear to prolong and heighten the sensitivity of 
realized moments to sovereign re-ratings information. When all crises are considered 
together, the estimated coefficients on crisis*notch_w are positive and significant 
indicating that financial crises strengthens the impact of both upgrades and 
downgrades but affect different higher moments. Across ALL crises, a one-notch 
upgrade during a crisis is associated with a significant increase in the right-skew by 
1.39 percent. A downgrade has a statistically and economically more significant effect 
on the second and fourth realized moment. A one-notch downgrade during a financial 
crisis can increase RV by an additional 8 basis points (total impact from a one-notch 
downgrade on RV during a financial crisis is thus 12 basis points) and increase RK by 
7.25%. Taken together, there is evidence to indicate that sovereign re-ratings do have 
asymmetric impacts on higher moment stock market returns with the downgrades 
having a stronger effect than upgrades. We also find that sovereign credit re-ratings 
during times of financial crises do present destabilizing effects on stock markets by 
increasing the realized volatility, skewness and kurtosis in market returns. This is 
consistent with the effects of funding constraints theorized by Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) to have implications for higher moments of returns. The evidence 
indicates that deteriorating sovereign governance results in sovereign rating 
downgrades that work to increase the cost of capital for firms within that country 
thereby increasing variability of stock price movements and ultimately, financial 
instability.   
In terms of the control variables, a few brief observations can be made. There 
is significant positive serial correlation in RV and RK indicating that it is necessary to 
account for this behavior in higher moments. As expected, there is a positive 
relationship between a country’s economic performance proxied by Log_GDP and the 
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degree of positive skewness in equity market returns. Currency volatility is also 
significant in the manner expected as an increase in FX volatility (FX_vol) is 
associated with an increase in realized volatility and left-skew in equity returns. A 
tight (loose) monetary policy stance works to reduce (increase) the realized volatility 
in equity market returns but the economic impact is minimal. There is no significant 
relationship between the underlying rating level of a country and the realized higher 
moments and this is likely due to the degree of sovereign creditworthiness being 
already captured by the set of macroeconomic control variables that are known to 
determine sovereign credit ratings (Hill and Faff, 2010). 
 
5.2 Rating impact from single vs. multi-notch rating changes 
Table 5 reports the effects of small (one-notch) and large (multi-notch) 
sovereign credit re-ratings on higher return moments across all past financial crises. 
The results are striking as there is a clear asymmetry in the effect of rating 
downgrades over upgrades. Single-notch upgrades significantly increase RS during 
normal times but large multi-notch upgrades exert an even stronger economic impact 
and equity returns become more right skewed in response to multi-notch upgrades 
during financial crises. On the other hand, both small and large downgrades have a 
very significant effect on RV and the impact of all downgrades is heightened during 
financial crises. This implies that procyclical rating revisions by credit rating agencies 
do exert destabilizing effects on stock markets during financial crises as downgrades 
given in times of financial distress and economic downturn will increase RV and 
disrupt equity markets. This finding corroborates Fei, Fuertes and Kalotychou’s 
(2012) related finding on the need to account for differences in credit rating migration 
over the business cycle for capital management purposes. Lastly, we find that while 
 18
large downgrades affect RK during normal times, the effects are not amplified during 
crises. 
<Insert Table 5> 
 
5.3 Rating impact from the investment grade threshold 
Table 6 reports the effects of sovereign credit re-ratings on realized higher 
moments of returns during all historical financial crises. This table again confirms that 
sovereign re-ratings have an asymmetric impact on the second, third and fourth 
moment of equity market returns. Upgrades to investment grade status are 
surprisingly insignificant and do not have incremental impact over and above the 
positive effect of upgrades in general during financial crises. However, the loss of 
investment grade status due to a downgrade is economically significant in increasing 
left-skew during financial crises. Interestingly, downgrades in general increase RV 
and RK during financial crises but there are no incremental investment grade 
threshold effects during crises.  
Taken together the evidence indicates that downgrades resulting in a loss of 
investment grade status is destabilizing for equity markets and increases the left-skew 
of equity market returns. This is consistent with crises being times of confusion and 
contagion and the dispersion of negative news like a loss of investment grade status 
for a country works to increase investor heterogeneity in equity markets as reflected 
in greater negative skewness. This result corroborates with Hong and Stein’s (2003) 
theory concerning information dispersion within financial markets. 
 
<Insert Table 6> 
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5.4 Rating impact across different types of financial crises  
Tables 7 to 9 report the effects of sovereign credit re-ratings information on 
realized volatility, skewness and kurtosis respectively during the various major 
financial crises occurring over our sample period (Asian, Russian, Tech, European 
and Global financial crises). It is apparent from the results reported in Table 7, that 
RV is the most sensitive to sovereign rating changes during debt-related crises. 
During the two main debt crises (European and Russian Debt Crises), realized equity 
market volatility was extra sensitive to both sovereign rating upgrades and 
downgrades but the effect of downgrades was both statistically and economically 
stronger. A one-notch downgrade during the RDC increased RV by 0.0044 per cent 
compared with an increase of only 0.0005 per cent for a one notch upgrade during the 
EDC. 
<Insert Table 7> 
 
In Table 8, upgrades are shown to increase the right-skew in equity markets 
during all crises and the Asian financial crisis (AFC). This corroborates Kaminsky 
and Schmukler’s (1999) earlier results showing that equity market returns were very 
sensitive to sovereign rating information during the AFC. We extend upon their 
earlier findings by documenting the significant effect on skewness in equity market 
returns as well. Sovereign rating downgrades appear to exert differential effects 
during debt versus non-debt related crises. In the 2001-2002 Tech Bust, downgrades 
increased left-skew in equity markets but during the Russian debt crisis, downgrades 
were actually received positively by equity market participants resulting in an 
increase in right-skew in equity market returns. It is possible that during a debt crisis, 
a rating downgrade can provide the certainty for financial market participants that the 
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debt situation is not as bad as anticipated and this can become good news for 
investors. This result corroborates with Beber and Brandt’s (2010) finding on 
macroeconomic news effects in bond markets during bad times. 
 
<Insert Table 8> 
 
In Table 9, it is shown that realized kurtosis (RK) is only affected by 
sovereign rating downgrades. Again this confirms the strong asymmetric effect of 
sovereign re-ratings on higher moments of equity market returns. During all financial 
crises and the 2001-2002 Tech bust realized kurtosis was significantly heightened by 
sovereign downgrades and the economic impacts were significant. A one-notch 
downgrade during the tech bust increased realized kurtosis by 24 percent and across 
ALL crises the effect was a milder 7.25 percent increase. 
 
<Insert Table 9> 
 
Consistent with our conjecture, we do find evidence that indicates on balance 
that sovereign re-ratings are particularly destabilizing during debt crises and credit 
fuelled crises like the tech boom-bust which saw much debt raising to fund 
investments in the Information Technology sector prior to 2001. This corroborates 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) view on funding constraints within financial 
markets and how it can ultimately lead to greater volatility, excess kurtosis and 
negative skewness. The sensitivity of equity markets to debt crises is not surprising as 
assessments on sovereign creditworthiness are crucial when there is an underlying 
fiscal debt problem in the economy. There are significant long-term economic and 
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reputational consequences for a sovereign obligor and companies within a country to 
default on their debts. Thus, sovereign re-ratings in times of crises and confusion also 
affect aggregate stock market return distributions and this finding has important 
implications for risk managers and policy makers.   
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we examine the effects of sovereign re-ratings on the second, 
third and fourth realized sample moments of national stock markets returns during all 
major financial crises in recent history. We address four related questions: 1) Do 
sovereign re-ratings have a greater impact on higher moments during times of 
financial crises? 2) Are there asymmetric impacts on higher moments with 
downgrades being more significant than upgrades? 3) Does the nature of the re-rating 
matter in terms of size and investment grade status? 4) Are sovereign re-ratings more 
impactful in debt crises? 
First, we find that stock markets react significantly to ratings announcements 
during financial crises. In times of crises, sovereign re-ratings provide more 
incremental information for higher stock return moments than country-specific 
macroeconomic determinants. Second, we find that there are asymmetric effects 
during financial crises in that downgrades are consistently more significant than 
upgrades in increasing realized volatility and kurtosis. Both upgrades and downgrades 
affect skewness in times of crises in the expected direction. Third, during crises only 
multi-notch upgrades significantly increase RV. The loss of investment grade status 
significantly increases the left-skew of equity market returns during financial crises 
but the upgrade to investment grade is less important. Lastly, the impact of re-ratings 
is generally stronger in debt-related crises.  
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Taken together our evidence shows that financial crises do indeed increase 
the awareness of stock market participants to sovereign re-ratings and this works to 
heighten financial market instability captured in the dynamics of higher moments 
during times of financial crises. Corroborating Cumming, Hou and Wu (2014), we 
also find that sovereign governance as captured by sovereign credit ratings is 
important for firm valuations, especially during financial crises. This suggests that 
rating agencies’ procyclical rating methods presents a source of uncertainty during 
periods of financial crises and clear communication regarding revisions is critical 
during financial crises. 
Future research in this area should focus on understanding the responses of 
different types of investors (e.g., retail vs. institutional) to credit rating information 
during financial crises. Moreover, rating impacts on higher return moments should be 
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Notes: This figure shows the weekly cumulative sovereign credit rating upgrades and 
downgrades (notch_w) issued by Standard and Poors (S&P) during non-crisis and 
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Table 1.  Summary of sovereign credit rating events  
  Upgrades Downgrades All 
  Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Panel A: Number of events by size of re-rating 
1 96 91% 84 72% 180 81% 
2 2 2% 20 17% 22 10% 
3 2 2% 8 7% 10 5% 
4 2 2% 3 3% 5 2% 
>=5 4 4% 1 1% 5 2% 
Total 106 116 222 
Panel B: Number of events by scale of rating change      
Single 
notch 96 91% 84 72% 180 81% 
Multi-
notch 10 9% 32 28% 42 19% 
Panel C: Number of events in crisis vs no-crisis periods     
Crisis 68 64% 101 87% 169 76% 
No-crisis 38 36% 15 13% 53 24% 
Panel D: Number of events by development status     
Emerging 86 81% 73 63% 159 72% 
Developed 20 19% 43 37% 63 28% 
Notes: This table reports the number of upgrades and downgrades given by S&P in our 
sample. Panel A shows the frequency of sovereign rating changes by number of notches, 
while Panel B shows the breakdown of the sovereign rating events into single and multi-notch 
changes. Panel C shows the number of rating events occurring during financial crisis and non-
crisis periods. Panel D reports the number of rating events for emerging and developed 






























Argentina  5 4 1 0 11 10 1 0 16 
Australia  2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Austria  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Belgium  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Brazil  7 7 0 1 2 2 0 0 9 
Canada 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Chile  3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
China  6 6 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 
Colombia  3 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Cyprus  2 2 0 0 8 5 3 1 10 
Czech 
Republic 
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Greece  6 3 3 0 10 4 6 1 16 
Hong 
Kong 
6 6 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 
Hungary  3 3 0 0 5 5 0 1 8 
Iceland  0 0 0 0 4 3 1 1 4 
India  2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Indonesia  8 5 3 0 11 7 4 0 19 
Ireland  2 2 0 0 6 5 1 0 8 
Israel  2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Italy  0 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 3 
Japan 1 1 0 0 4 4 0 0 5 
Korea  7 6 1 1 4 1 3 1 11 
Malaysia 3 3 0 1 4 3 1 1 7 
Malta  0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 
New 
Zealand 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Pakistan  4 4 0 0 8 5 3 0 12 
Philippines  4 4 0 0 2 2 0 0 6 
Portugal  1 1 0 0 6 3 3 1 7 
Slovak 
Republic 
6 6 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 
South 
Africa  
2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Spain  2 2 0 0 6 3 3 1 8 
Taiwan  0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 
Thailand  2 2 0 1 3 2 1 1 5 
Turkey  6 6 0 0 2 2 0 0 8 
Uruguay  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
























Notes: This table reports the number of upgrades and downgrades instigated by S&P for each 
country as well as the breakdown by size of the rating change (single notch vs. multiple 
notches). It also shows the number of upgrades from non-investment to investment grade 
status (Up_IG) and the number of downgrades from investment to non-investment grade 
(Down_IG). Total gives the number of upgrades and downgrades combined. 
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Table 3. Average realized higher moments by country 
Country        RR       RV        RS       RK 
Argentina  0.0025 0.0489 -0.3461 4.2521
Australia  0.0009 0.0205 -1.1495 7.4695
Austria  0.0011 0.0326 -1.7611 16.0922
Belgium  0.0014 0.1093 -0.1418 413.2171
Brazil  0.0002 0.0867 -19.2280 500.4774
Canada 0.0009 0.0242 -1.1319 9.1878
Chile  0.0013 0.0208 -0.8000 7.7715
China  0.0015 0.0364 -0.0941 3.2357
Colombia  0.0040 0.1201 0.2760 273.6832
Cyprus  -0.0048 0.0642 -0.2174 2.3600
Czech Republic -0.0011 0.0364 -1.4617 13.6936
Greece  0.0002 0.0429 -0.0839 3.0767
Hong Kong  0.0009 0.0351 -0.4529 3.2708
Hungary  0.0013 0.0406 -1.1263 8.7257
Iceland  -0.0060 0.0686 -12.1969 184.9213
India  0.0020 0.0351 -0.2791 2.0301
Indonesia  0.0023 0.0397 -0.4285 4.6344
Ireland  0.0007 0.0313 -1.7476 14.3488
Israel  0.0017 0.0284 -0.6033 2.7940
Italy  -0.0001 0.0343 -0.5672 1.1280
Japan 0.0006 0.0334 -0.0603 3.8592
Korea  0.0009 0.0416 -0.4114 2.8970
Malaysia 0.0006 0.0297 0.1151 10.8207
Malta  0.0077 0.1683 22.4151 526.3532
New Zealand 0.0003 0.0174 -0.4835 3.6655
Pakistan  0.0030 0.0378 -0.8357 3.5022
Philippines  0.0015 0.0296 -0.9076 5.6402
Portugal  0.0012 0.0258 -1.0568 7.6092
Slovak Republic 0.0010 0.0269 -0.5114 15.7256
South Africa  0.0024 0.0269 -0.0766 3.7856
Spain  0.0012 0.0312 -0.8245 5.0454
Taiwan  0.0005 0.0338 -0.2644 2.6789
Thailand  0.0001 0.0384 -0.2647 4.7240
Turkey  0.0049 0.0573 -0.0958 3.5036
Uruguay  -0.1929 0.7999 -4.2587 18.7826
Venezuela  0.0077 0.0443 0.8786 7.0249
 
Notes: This table reports the average values of weekly realized returns (RR), realized 
volatility (RV), realized skewness (RS) and realized kurtosis (RK) for each sample country.  
Our full sample comprises 36 national stock market indices over the period 2 January 1996 to 
13 November 2013.  
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Table 4. Impact of sovereign re-ratings on realized higher moments 
 
Notes: This table presents the baseline model panel estimation results for stock market 
realized volatility (RV), skewness (RS), and kurtosis (RK), over the sample period from 2 
January 1996 to 13 November 2013 for all 36 countries studied. Model specifications are 
based on Eq. (5) as follows ܴܯ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴܯ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧ ൅ ߚଷ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ௪௜,௧ ൅ ߚସܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൅
ߚହܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൈ ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ௪௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ݑ௜,௧. RMt-1 is the realized moment (i.e. RV, RS or RK) from the 
past week, Rating is the linear rating score and notch_w is the cumulative number of notches 
re-rated during the week. Crisis is an aggregate financial crisis indicator that takes on a value 
of one during crisis periods and zero otherwise and the crisis periods included are from Jul. 
1997 – Jan. 1998: the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC); Aug. 1998 – Oct. 1998: the Russian Debt 
Crisis (RDC); Mar. 2000 – Sept. 2002 for the Tech/Terrorist (Tech) crisis of confidence; Jul. 
2007 – May 2010: the Global Financial Crisis (GFC); and Dec. 2008 – Nov. 2013: the 
European Debt crisis (EDC). Crisis is a composite measure of all these major crises as well as 
the brief Brazilian (in Feb. 1999) and Turkish (Feb. 2001) crises. Log_GDP is the log of 
Gross Domestic Product, FX_vol is the volatility of the local currency against the US dollar 
measured as weekly rolling standard deviations of the currency’s returns, Mon_policy is a 
monetary regime indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when short-term interest rates 
increase and only revert to zero when interest rates are subsequently cut. Country fixed effects 
and clustered standard errors are used. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
levels (p-values are shown in parentheses).  
Dependent var. RV RS RK RV RS RK
RMt-1 0.1431 0.0215 0.1338 0.3661*** -0.0045 0.2278***
(0.2584) (0.7627) (0.2701) (0.0030) (0.9623) (0.0068)
rating 0.0001 -0.1031 1.3278 0.0000 0.0661 0.1676
(0.3260) (0.1446) (0.4357) (0.4522) (0.2391) (0.8624)
notch_w -0.0000 0.2914 -1.4991 0.0004* 0.0014 -2.6882
(0.6572) (0.1829) (0.4637) (0.0948) (0.9932) (0.1509)
Crisis 0.0009 -1.0167 4.6891 0.0001 -0.7944* 0.9555
(0.1476) (0.1638) (0.4742) (0.8865) (0.0745) (0.8954)
Crisis*notch_w -0.0005 1.3885** -0.6238 0.0008* -0.1655 7.2514*
(0.3469) (0.0160) (0.9435) (0.0719) (0.6397) (0.0670)
Log_GDP -0.0017 2.6904*** -1.7116 -0.0012 1.2442 6.0507
(0.2143) (0.0011) (0.8991) (0.1386) (0.1024) (0.6226)
FX_vol 0.0878*** -226.606*** -245.453 0.0052 12.2449 -273.619
(0.0048) (0.0000) (0.8079) (0.6574) (0.6121) (0.3854)
Mon_policy -0.0002 0.3515 -0.9603 -0.0008** -0.2248 3.9630
(0.4165) (0.3382) (0.8261) (0.0320) (0.4896) (0.5177)
Intercept 0.0144 -21.4225*** 22.4212 0.0117 -12.0893* -38.3638
(0.2140) (0.0025) (0.8515) (0.1173) (0.0833) (0.7457)
Country F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
adj. R-sq 0.0610 0.0949 0.0157 0.2984 0.0132 0.0706
N 212 211 211 232 232 232
Upgrades Downgrades
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Table 5. Impact of single and multiple notch sovereign re-ratings on realized 
higher moments 
 
Notes: This table presents the panel estimation results for stock market realized volatility 
(RV), skewness (RS), and kurtosis (RK), over the sample period from 2 January 1996 to 13 
November 2013 for all 36 countries studied with the following model specifications (i.e. Eq. 
(6)): ܴܯ݅,ݐ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ1ܴܯ݅,ݐെ1 ൅ ߚ2ܴܽݐ݅݊݃݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ3ݏ݈݅݊݃݁_݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ4݉ݑ݈ݐ݅_݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅
ߚ5ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐ ൅ ߚ6ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐ ൈ ݏ݈݅݊݃݁_݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ7ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏݐ ൈ݉ݑ݈ݐ݅_݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ݅,ݐ ൅ ߚ8ܺ݅,ݐ ൅ ݑ݅,ݐ. 
RMt-1 is the realized moment (i.e. RV, RS or RK) from the past week, Rating is the average 
linear rating score for the week. Single_notch_w is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 
when notch_w is equal to 1 and zero otherwise. Multi_notch_w is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of 1 when notch_w is greater than 1 and zero otherwise. Crisis is an aggregate 
financial crisis indicator that takes on a value of one during any crisis period and zero 
otherwise and the crisis periods included are from Jul. 1997 – Jan. 1998: the Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC); Aug. 1998 – Oct. 1998: the Russian Debt Crisis (RDC); Mar. 2000 – Sept. 
2002: the Tech/Terrorist (Tech) crisis of confidence; Jul. 2007 – May 2010: the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC); and Dec. 2008 – Nov. 2013: the European Debt crisis (EDC). Crisis 
is a composite measure of all these major crises as well as the brief Brazilian (in Feb. 1999) 
and Turkish (Feb. 2001) crises. Country fixed effects and clustered standard errors are used. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels (p-values are shown in 
parentheses). 
 
Dependent Var. RV RS RK RV RS RK
RMt-1 0.1437 0.0164 0.1392 0.3837*** -0.0035 0.2221**
(0.2520) (0.8155) (0.2522) (0.0021) (0.9698) (0.0137)
rating 0.0001 -0.1277* 1.2561 0.0000 0.0815 -0.1423
(0.3629) (0.0729) (0.4748) (0.2481) (0.2567) (0.8914)
crisis 0.0010 -0.1680 -2.3417 -0.0007 -1.4472 12.0454
(0.1757) (0.9062) (0.7981) (0.1444) (0.2585) (0.5053)
single_notch_w 0.0001 0.8883** -2.6753 0.0006* -0.4469 -1.8235
(0.7783) (0.0489) (0.5442) (0.0644) (0.3905) (0.7008)
multi_notch_w -0.0001 1.0896 -7.1738 0.0015** 0.1305 10.6923*
(0.7799) (0.2071) (0.4428) (0.0300) (0.8173) (0.0833)
single_notch_w*crisis -0.0007 0.0410 9.4548 0.0017** 0.9257 -6.8048
(0.4734) (0.9801) (0.5132) (0.0199) (0.5113) (0.7116)
multi_notch_w*crisis -0.0013 5.8075*** -26.9535 0.0019* 0.1638 5.1109
(0.3245) (0.0006) (0.3486) (0.0964) (0.8681) (0.6926)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
adj. R-sq 0.0518 0.1076 0.0133 0.3036 0.0106 0.0615
N 212 211 211 232 232 232
Upgrades Downgrades
 31
Table 6. Impact of sovereign re-ratings across the investment grade demarcation 
on realized higher moments 
 
 
Notes: This table presents the panel estimation results for stock market realized volatility 
(RV), skewness (RS), and kurtosis (RK), over the sample period from 2 January 1996 to 13 
November 2013 for all 36 countries studied with the following model specifications (i.e. Eq. 
(7)):	ܴܯ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴܯ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܽݐ݅݊݃௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ௜,௧ ൅ ߚସܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൅ ߚହܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൈ
݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܫܩ_݄ܿ݃ ൅ ߚ଻݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ௜,௧ ൈ ܫܩ_݄ܿ݃ ൅ ߚ଼݊݋ݐ݄ܿ_ݓ௜,௧ ൈ ܫܩ_݄ܿ݃ ൈ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൅
ߚଽ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ݑ௜,௧.  RMt-1 is the realized moment (i.e. RV, RS or RK) from the past week, Rating is 
the linear rating score and notch_w is the cumulative number of notches re-rated during the 
week. IG_chg is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when an upgrade or downgrade 
crosses the investment grade demarcation. Crisis is an aggregate financial crisis indicator that 
takes on a value of one during any crisis period and zero otherwise and the crisis periods 
included are from Jul. 1997 – Jan. 1998: the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC); Aug. 1998 – Oct. 
1998: the Russian Debt Crisis (RDC); Mar. 2000 – Sept. 2002: the Tech/Terrorist (Tech) 
crisis of confidence; Jul. 2007 – May 2010: the Global Financial Crisis (GFC); and Dec. 2008 
– Nov. 2013: the European Debt crisis (EDC). Crisis is a composite measure of all these 
major crises as well as the brief Brazilian (in Feb. 1999) and Turkish (Feb. 2001) crises. 
Country fixed effects and clustered standard errors are used. *, ** and *** denote significance 







Dependent Var. RV RS RK RV RS RK
RMt-1 0.1430 0.0211 0.1348 0.3712*** -0.0216 0.2301***
(0.2583) (0.7651) (0.2677) (0.0037) (0.8234) (0.0066)
rating 0.0001 -0.1038 1.3671 0.0000 0.0756 0.1879
(0.3380) (0.1443) (0.4189) (0.5388) (0.1846) (0.8498)
notch_w -0.0000 0.2889 -1.3481 0.0003 0.0175 -2.7016
(0.6071) (0.1855) (0.5079) (0.1222) (0.9138) (0.1435)
crisis 0.0010 -1.0024 3.7550 0.0002 -0.8873* -0.4125
(0.1190) (0.1820) (0.5551) (0.7855) (0.0921) (0.9572)
crisis*notch_w -0.0006 1.3804** -0.1027 0.0008* -0.3233 9.8735**
(0.3127) (0.0178) (0.9907) (0.0935) (0.4765) (0.0135)
IG_chg 0.0008 0.2591 -15.3535** -0.0019 3.3563 12.0940
(0.3868) (0.7216) (0.0318) (0.2534) (0.1890) (0.3835)
notch_w*IG_chg 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 -1.7649 -7.8062
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.2376) (0.1617) (0.3005)
notch_w * crisis *IG_chg 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.8721* -3.6953
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.4718) (0.0709) (0.4341)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
adj. R-sq 0.0592 0.0906 0.0165 0.2932 0.0207 0.0633
N 212 211 211 232 232 232
Upgrades Downgrades
 32





Notes: This table presents the baseline model panel estimation results for stock market 
realized volatility (RV) over the sample period from 2 January 1996 to 13 November 2013 for 
all 36 countries studied. Model specifications are based on Eq. (5) as follows ܴܯ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߚଵܴܯ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧ ൅ ߚଷ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ௪௜,௧ ൅ ߚସܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൅ ߚହܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൈ ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ௪௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ݑ௜,௧.  RMt-1 
is the realized moment (RV) from the past week, Rating is the average linear rating score 
during the week and notch_w is the cumulative number of notches re-rated during the week. 
Crisis is either the aggregate financial crisis indicator that takes on a value of one during ALL 
crisis periods and zero otherwise or during major individual crises. Crisis periods included are 
from Jul. 1997 – Jan. 1998: the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC); Aug. 1998 – Oct. 1998: the 
Russian Debt Crisis (RDC); Mar. 2000 – Sept. 2002: the Tech/Terrorist (Tech) crisis of 
confidence; Jul. 2007 – May 2010: the Global Financial Crisis (GFC); and Dec. 2008 – Nov. 
2013: the European Debt crisis (EDC). Country fixed effects and clustered standard errors are 
























Crisis ALL AFC RDC TECH EDC GFC ALL AFC RDC TECH EDC GFC
RMt-1 0.1431 0.1701 0.1620 0.1105 0.1644 0.1414 0.3661*** 0.3945*** 0.4586*** 0.4291*** 0.4319*** 0.4267***
(0.2584) (0.1813) (0.2117) (0.2653) (0.1918) (0.2853) (0.0030) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0008)
rating 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001
(0.3260) (0.2480) (0.1511) (0.2391) (0.1722) (0.3335) (0.4522) (0.3629) (0.2519) (0.2490) (0.0466) (0.2823)
notch_w -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0004 0.0005** 0.0006** 0.0005** 0.0005 0.0005*
(0.6572) (0.5513) (0.1482) (0.4098) (0.2377) (0.6286) (0.1048) (0.0245) (0.0343) (0.0472) (0.1062) (0.0818)
Crisis 0.0009 -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0062*** -0.0005 0.0010 0.0001 0.0008 0.0059* 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0006
(0.1476) (0.4822) (0.4426) (0.0000) (0.3331) (0.1916) (0.8865) (0.5036) (0.0776) (0.9999) (0.1353) (0.4279)
Crisis*notch_w -0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0005* -0.0003 0.0008* 0.0009 0.0044** 0.0002 0.0007 0.0006
(0.3469) (0.7784) (0.2195) (0.9999) (0.0583) (0.8220) (0.0719) (0.3057) (0.0466) (0.2755) (0.1125) (0.4226)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
adj. R-sq 0.0610 0.0572 0.0570 0.0985 0.0520 0.0636 0.2984 0.2987 0.2831 0.2785 0.2795 0.2780









Notes: This table presents the baseline model panel estimation results for stock market 
realised skewness (RS) over the sample period from 2 January 1996 to 13 November 2013 for 
all 36 countries studied. Model specifications are based on Eq. (5) as follows ܴܯ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߚଵܴܯ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧ ൅ ߚଷ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ௪௜,௧ ൅ ߚସܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൅ ߚହܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൈ ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ௪௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ݑ௜,௧.  RMt-1 
is the realized moment (RS) from the past week, Rating is the average linear rating score 
during the week and notch_w is the cumulative number of notches re-rated during the week. 
Crisis is either the aggregate financial crisis indicator that takes on a value of one during ALL 
crisis periods and zero otherwise or during major individual crises. Crisis periods included are 
from Jul. 1997 – Jan. 1998: the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC); Aug. 1998 – Oct. 1998: the 
Russian Debt Crisis (RDC); Mar. 2000 – Sept. 2002: the Tech/Terrorist (Tech) crisis of 
confidence; Jul. 2007 – May 2010: the Global Financial Crisis (GFC); and Dec. 2008 – Nov. 
2013: the European Debt crisis (EDC). Country fixed effects and clustered standard errors are 
























Crisis ALL AFC RDC TECH EDC GFC ALL AFC GFC RDC TECH EDC
RMt-1 0.0215 0.0234 0.0290 0.0355 0.0282 0.0282 -0.0045 -0.0314 0.0003 -0.0122 -0.0250 -0.0136
(0.7627) (0.7357) (0.6823) (0.5989) (0.6757) (0.6814) (0.9623) (0.7541) (0.9977) (0.8983) (0.8000) (0.8887)
rating -0.1031 -0.0752 -0.1085 -0.1101 -0.1307* -0.1210 0.0661 0.0398 0.0534 0.0413 0.0219 0.0612
(0.1446) (0.3469) (0.1611) (0.1460) (0.0897) (0.1105) (0.2391) (0.4561) (0.3658) (0.4532) (0.6680) (0.2865)
notch_w 0.2914 0.3443* 0.3469 0.3331 0.3934 0.2925 0.0014 -0.1648 -0.1282 -0.2405 -0.0330 -0.2922*
(0.1829) (0.0944) (0.2390) (0.1603) (0.2022) (0.2370) (0.9932) (0.3725) (0.4646) (0.1266) (0.8345) (0.0677)
Crisis -1.0167 -5.4035** -0.4111 3.9123*** 0.3480 -0.6527 -0.7944* -1.9648** -0.9639 -0.6284 0.0000 0.1088
(0.1638) (0.0366) (0.6494) (0.0000) (0.6546) (0.5672) (0.0745) (0.0152) (0.3118) (0.2798) (0.9999) (0.8863)
Crisis*Notch_w 1.3885** 4.0415*** -0.0065 0.0000 -0.4011 1.4599 -0.1655 0.9673 0.5029 0.3129* -2.0751*** 0.5297
(0.0160) (0.0012) (0.9861) (0.9999) (0.3735) (0.2996) (0.6397) (0.1608) (0.3881) (0.0878) (0.0000) (0.1174)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
adj. R-sq 0.0949 0.1067 0.0791 0.0950 0.0797 0.0862 0.0132 0.0016 -0.0033 0.0011 0.0443 0.0028









Notes: This table presents the baseline model panel estimation results for stock market  
realised kurtosis (RK) over the sample period from 2 January 1996 to 13 November 2013 for 
all 36 countries studied. Model specifications are based on Eq. (5) as follows ܴܯ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߚଵܴܯ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܽݐ݅݊ ௜݃,௧ ൅ ߚଷ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ௪௜,௧ ൅ ߚସܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൅ ߚହܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൈ ݊݋ݐ݄ܿ௪௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ݑ௜,௧.  RMt-1 
is the realized moment (RK) from the past week, Rating is the average linear rating score 
during the week and notch_w is the cumulative number of notches re-rated during the week. 
Crisis is either the aggregate financial crisis indicator that takes on a value of one during ALL 
crisis periods and zero otherwise or during major individual crises. The crisis periods included 
are from Jul. 1997 – Jan. 1998: the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC); Aug. 1998 – Oct. 1998: the 
Russian Debt Crisis (RDC); Mar. 2000 – Sept. 2002: the Tech/Terrorist (Tech) crisis of 
confidence; Jul. 2007 – May 2010: the Global Financial Crisis (GFC); and Dec. 2008 – Nov. 
2013: the European Debt crisis (EDC). Country fixed effects and clustered standard errors are 






Crisis ALL AFC RDC TECH EDC GFC ALL AFC RDC TECH EDC GFC
RMt-1 0.1338 0.1296 0.1300 0.1424 0.1447 0.1463 0.2278*** 0.2328*** 0.2390*** 0.2445*** 0.2367*** 0.2360***
(0.2701) (0.2653) (0.2597) (0.2544) (0.2449) (0.2400) (0.0068) (0.0088) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0061)
rating 1.3278 1.0863 1.4012 1.4583 1.6393 1.4841 0.1676 0.3656 0.2857 0.4850 0.1383 0.3006
(0.4357) (0.5243) (0.4304) (0.3983) (0.3917) (0.3698) (0.8624) (0.6912) (0.7585) (0.5880) (0.8893) (0.7813)
notch_w -1.4991 -1.5650 -2.1662 -1.5286 -2.1204 -1.4397 -2.6882 -1.0608 0.8433 -1.7821 0.7824 -0.0583
(0.4637) (0.4514) (0.2313) (0.4589) (0.2913) (0.5034) (0.1509) (0.5906) (0.5903) (0.3064) (0.5550) (0.9773)
Crisis 4.6891 59.8267 14.3890 24.9278** -1.8720 -1.2039 0.9555 -3.7410 5.5658 0.0000 -1.4487 10.6608
(0.4742) (0.2126) (0.3513) (0.0001) (0.8797) (0.8940) (0.8954) (0.7109) (0.3562) (0.9999) (0.8526) (0.4719)
Crisis*notch_w -0.6238 -31.3142 2.1821 0.0000 3.9086 -0.3935 7.2514* 6.6605 -3.9362 24.1920** -4.2889 -9.5460
(0.9435) (0.1796) (0.5136) (0.9999) (0.4498) (0.9610) (0.0670) (0.2953) (0.1191) (0.0000) (0.2144) (0.2719)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
adj. R-sq 0.0157 0.0320 0.0277 0.0212 0.0146 0.0127 0.0706 0.0540 0.0603 0.1021 0.0573 0.0577
N 211 211 211 211 211 211 232 232 232 232 232 232
RK
DowngradesUpgrades
